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Principle of uncertain future and utility 
 
Alexander Harin  
 
The principle of uncertain future: the probability of a future event contains a 
degree of (hidden) uncertainty.  As a result, this uncertainty (in a sense, 
similar to vibrations, fluctuations) pushes the probability value back from 
the bounds to the middle of its range (from ~100% and ~0% to the middle 
probability values).  In other words, the real values of high probabilities are 
lower than the preliminarily determined ones.  Conversely, the real values of 
low probabilities are higher than the preliminarily determined ones.  This 
result provides the uniform solution of a number of fundamental problems: 
the underweighting of high and the overweighting of low probabilities, the 
Allais paradox, risk aversion, loss aversion, the Ellsberg paradox, the equity 
premium puzzle, etc.  The principle and its consequences can be applied in 
the fields of banking, investment, insurance, trade, industry, planning and 
forecasting.  Explanations of the principle and examples of solution of three 
types of basic utility problems are provided.   
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0.1.  A simple one-page explanation of the principle of uncertain future 
 
Problems 
 
The well-determined but unexplained facts are:  
“When valuing risky prospects, people typically overweight small probabilities and 
underweight large probabilities.”  (Fehr-Duda et al 2006) 
These facts give rise to a number of problems including the Allais paradox, risk aversion, the 
equity premium puzzle, the explanation of the shape of the probability weighting function along 
with other unsolved problems.   
 
 
The principle of uncertain future 
 
The probability (P) of a future event contains a degree (∆P) of uncertainty  
P  ~  Ppreliminary determined ± ∆P 
in comparison with the preliminary precisely determined probability (Ppreliminary determined).   
 
 
The repulsion from a (rigid) bound of range 
 
The probability value ranges from 0% to 100%.  The value of probability cannot be less than 
0% or more than 100%  (The bounds of the range are, in a sense, similar to rigid walls).   
Because of this, the uncertainty pushes the probability value back from the bounds to the 
middle of the range (in a sense, similar to the action of vibrations, fluctuations).   
 
 
For example 
 
Suppose we wish to test the probability values, which are very close (but not equal) to 0% or 
100%.  For example, we choose 1% or 99%.   
Suppose the uncertainty value (∆P) is essentially more than the distance of the probability 
value from the bound.  For example, ∆P = 10%.   
Then, evidently, (if we make the test as if there is no uncertainty) the mean distance of the 
probability value from the bound cannot be as small as 1% (if the uncertainty value is 10%).   
Generally, the mean distance of the probability value from the bound cannot be considerably 
less than the uncertainty value.   
Thus, the mean value of probability (Preal mean) cannot be as low as 1%.  It cannot be as high 
as 99% also.   
 
 
Solution of the problems 
 
So, in the above example, denoting the real mean value of probability, which value is near 
100% as Phigh real mean, the real mean value of probability, which value is near 0% as Plow real mean 
and the preliminary precisely determined probability as (Ppreliminary determined) we obtain 
   Phigh real mean  < Ppreliminary determined
   Plow real mean  >  Ppreliminary determined
 
Accordingly, the above problems can be solved.   
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0.2.  A slightly more complex explanation 
 
Problems 
 
The well-determined but unexplained facts are:  
For positive (gains) risky prospects, people typically overweight low probabilities but 
underweight high probabilities.  For negative (losses) risky prospects, people typically 
underweight low probabilities but overweight high probabilities.   
These facts give rise to a number of unsolved fundamental problems.   
 
The principle of uncertain future 
 
The probability (P) of a future event contains a degree (∆P) of uncertainty  
P  ~  Ppreliminary determined ± ∆P 
in comparison with the preliminary exactly determined probability (Ppreliminary determined).   
 
The repulsion from a (rigid) bound of range 
 
The probability value ranges from 0% to 100%.  The value of probability cannot be less than 
0% or more than 100%  (The bounds of the range are, in a sense, similar to rigid walls).   
Because of this, the uncertainty (in a sense, similar to vibrations, fluctuations) pushes the 
probability value back from the bounds of the range to the direction of the middle of the range.   
 
For example 
 
Suppose we wish to test the probability values, which are very close (but not equal) to 0% or 
100%.  For example, we select 1% or 99%.   
Suppose the uncertainty value (∆P) is essentially more than the distance of the probability 
value from the bound.  For example, ∆P = 10%.   
Then, evidently, (if we make the test as if there is no uncertainty) the mean distance of the 
probability value from the bound cannot be as small as 1% (if the uncertainty value is 10%).   
Generally, the mean distance of the probability value from the bound cannot be considerably 
less than the uncertainty value.   
Therefore, the mean value of probability (Preal mean) cannot be as low as 1%.  It cannot be as 
high as 99% also.   
 
Solution of the problems 
 
So, in the above example, denoting the real mean value of probability, which value is near 
100% as Phigh real mean, we obtain  
   Phigh real mean  < Ppreliminary determined
Denoting the (positive) value of gain as G and the (negative) value of loss as – G, we obtain  
   G × Phigh real mean  < G × Ppreliminary determined
   -G × Phigh real mean  > -G × Ppreliminary determined
- the underweight of high probabilities gains and the overweight of high probabilities losses.   
Denoting the mean value of probability, which value is near 0% as Plow real mean we obtain  
   Plow real mean  >  Ppreliminary determined
   G × Plow real mean  > G × Ppreliminary determined
   -G × Plow real mean  < -G × Ppreliminary determined
- the overweight of low probabilities gains and the underweight of low probabilities losses.  
Thus, the above problems can be solved.   
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Introduction 
 
The final statement of Hey and Orme (1994) was “... we are tempted to conclude by saying 
that our study indicates that behavior can be reasonably well modeled (to what might be termed a 
“reasonable approximation”) as “expected utility plus noise.” Perhaps we should now spend 
some time thinking about the noise, rather than about even more alternatives to expected utility?”  
Harin (2005), Harin (2006) and this paper renew, generalize and develop this statement.   
 
1.  Principle of uncertain future 
1.1.  General principle of uncertain future 
 
Future events may be considered as, at least partially, uncertain.    
This uncertainty or partial uncertainty may be invisible or imperceptible.  It may be crucial.  
In any case, the overwhelming majority of future events contain, at least a part of uncertainty.  In 
a simple form this principle may sound like:  
Future events contain (at least) a degree of uncertainty.   
 
1.2.  Specific principle of uncertain future 
 
The specific principle of uncertain future emphasizes one of uncertain aspects of future 
events, namely probability.  It states probabilities of future events are, to some extent, uncertain.  
This extent may be invisible, imperceptible.  It may be considerable, even crucial.  In any case, 
the overwhelming majority of future events contain, at least, a degree of uncertainty.  In a simple 
form this principle may sound like:  
The probability of every future event contains (at least) a degree of (hidden) uncertainty.   
 
1.2.1.  Example 
 
Suppose Mr. Somebody offers you a prize.  The choice is either a guaranteed prize or one of 
a lottery.  The lottery prize has value which is greater and the probability which is less than those 
of the guaranteed one.  The mean values to win the lottery and guaranteed prizes are equal to 
each other.  The probability to win in the lottery is equal to P < 100%).   
This scenario gives rise to a number of unsolved fundamental problems (e.g., the Allais 
paradox, risk aversion, loss aversion, overweighting of low probabilities, the Kahneman-Tversky 
paradox and the equity premium puzzle).   
Assume two variants of the preliminarily determined probability Ppreliminary.  They are 
regarded as high and low:   
Phigh preliminary determined  = 99%.   
Plow preliminary determined  = 1%, 
Suppose the probability’s uncertainty is ±∆P.  Then all variants of the real probability P will 
be uncertain  
P ~ P preliminary determined ± ∆P.   
Suppose the probability’s uncertainty is essentially more than 1% (e.g. ∆P = 10%) and is 
uniform.  Then the real mean values of probability Pmean: will be 
Phigh real mean < 99%.   
Plow real mean > 1%,  
Real low probability will be higher than the preliminary determined one.   
Real high probability will be lower than the preliminary determined one.   
The unsolved problems may be solved.   
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1.3.  Miscellaneous 
Evident and hidden (latent) uncertainties 
 
There are evident and hidden, latent uncertainties.  To consider evident uncertainties is, in a 
sense, obvious and trivial and often not beneficial.  The primary (but not the only) goal of the 
principle of uncertain future is to consider hidden, latent uncertainties.   
So, the situation of the example contains the evident uncertainty in the lottery (You may 
either win or not).  But there is a hidden uncertainty.  It is, e.g., the probability of winning in the 
lottery (and in reality receive your prize) may not be certainly equal to P (The lottery may have a 
defect or suffer a failure; suddenly, you or Mr. Somebody may become ill; Mr. Somebody’s 
offer may be a joke or trick; anybody (curious person, terrorist, policeman, etc.) may interfere in 
the process, etc.).   
 
 
Influence of the principle 
 
In some cases, an influence of this principle will be negligible.  In some cases, this influence 
will improve a precision of calculations.  In some cases, it will be essential, even critical.  But it 
is sufficiently essential and usual to prevent the economic theory to be developed as successful 
as it might be.   
So, instead of 50 years of numerous attempts at solving the famous paradox of Nobel 
laureate Allais, another Nobel laureate, Kahneman, along with Thaler, (2005) noted “… the 
paradoxes of Allais (1953) … have demonstrated inconsistency in preferences.”   
In any case, collective elaborate definition, development and application of the principle of 
uncertain future will improve the scientific accuracy of economic theory.   
 
 
Literature review 
 
Generally, the approach of the principle renews, generalizes and develops the results of Hey 
and Orme (1994).   
The search of the term “principle of uncertain future” in economic literature found in titles or 
keywords offers no examples in the predominant meaning of this paper.   
The classical review in Schoemaker (1982) and the most recent (one month before Harin 
(2005), which was the first feature paper on this idea) review in Quiggin and Chambers (2005) 
do not mention this idea.  The author’s review of RePEc from 1969 does not find this idea either.   
Similar or supporting ideas are primarily in Hey and Orme (1994) and secondly, e.g., in 
Quiggin (2005) and Novarese (2002).   
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Questions, generalizations and analogies  
 
At the present time, the name and wording of the principle are open to questioning.  Advice 
is welcomed.   
Generally, this principle may be also treated and referred to as the “Economic uncertainty 
principle” or the “Future uncertainty principle” or the “Principle of future’s uncertainty” or the 
“Principle of hidden uncertainties,” etc.   
The principle of uncertain future may be, to some extent, treated in terms of incomplete or 
asymmetric information.   
There are evident analogies between Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle and Einstein’s 
general and specific theories of relativity on one hand and the principle of uncertain future on the 
other.  There is an evident influence of the great physicians on the new principle.   
Moreover, the principle of uncertain future can be, to some extent, the consequence of 
Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle.  Indeed, one cannot simultaneously measure both impulse 
and position better than with uncertainty  
 
∆p × ∆x ≥ ћ / 2  
where 
∆p   - impulse uncertainty,  
∆x   - position uncertainty,  
ћ   - Planck's constant divided by 2π.   
This fact, along with the actual impossibility to know all the reasons and origins of future 
events, can give rise to future events’ uncertainties.   
The situation, when comparing the economic theory without and with the principle of 
uncertain future, is in a sense analogous to the situation when comparing classical and quantum 
physics.  Classical physics does not consider Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle, which is one of 
the cornerstones of quantum physics.  The “classical” economic theory does not consider the 
principle of uncertain future.   
Consider these two processes:  
 
a process which is a basic one for economics – a choice of an outcome which 
probability is P,  
and  
a process which is a basic one for physics – a scattering on a barrier which the height 
is H.   
 
In both cases, when the uncertainty is essential: 
 for high P and H the choice and the scattering are lower than those of the classical theory;  
 for low P and H the choice and the scattering are higher than those of the classical theory.   
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1.4.  Analysis of the specific principle 
1.4.1. Mathematical expression of the principle 
 
Mathematically, this principle may be written in the form of two expressions:  
 
The first 
(1.1a)   P ~ Ppreliminary + ∆+P(SSituation; Ppreliminary) - ∆-P(SSituation; Ppreliminary)  
 
where and below  
P   - the value of real or future probability;   
Ppreliminary  - the preliminarily determined P;   
SSituation  - a set of parameters of the situation 
∆+P   - the part of probability’s uncertainty, which increases P;   
∆-P   - the part of probability’s uncertainty, which decreases P;   
 
or, simplified,   
 
(1.1)  P ~ Ppreliminary ± ∆P(SSituation; Ppreliminary)  
 
where  
∆P   = (plus) ∆+P and (minus) ∆-P  
 
The second 
(1.2)  Pmean = Ppreliminary + δP(SSituation; Ppreliminary)  
 
where  
Pmean   - the mean value of P;  
δP  - the shift, the bias of the mean value of real or future P in the comparison 
with the value of preliminarily determined P  (δP may be positive or 
negative).   
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1.4.2.  First consequence  
 
The aforementioned example  
 
Phigh preliminary  = 99%.   
Plow preliminary  = 1%, 
and 
Phigh mean  < 99%.   
Plow mean  > 1%,  
 
using equation (1.2) 
 
    Pmean = Ppreliminary  +  δP 
 
may be generalized and written in the following format:  
 
(2.1a)    δPhigh  < 0  
δPlow  > 0 
 
where and below (in paragraph 1.4.2)   
high  - refers to Ppreliminary (and corresponding P), such as (100% - Ppreliminary) is 
small in comparison with ∆+P  
 
where and below   
low  - refers to Ppreliminary (and corresponding P), such as Ppreliminary is small in 
comparison with ∆-P  
 
or 
(2.1b)    Phigh mean  = P high preliminary.- |δP|< P high preliminary. 
Plow mean  = Plow preliminary,+|δP| > Plow preliminary, 
 
or, simplified,  
(2.1)    Phigh mean  < P high preliminary.  
Plow mean  > Plow preliminary,  
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1.4.3.  First hypothesis 
 
Compare these two events: a preliminarily uncertain event and a preliminarily certain event, 
e.g., a lottery and a guarantee.  When the other conditions of these events are the same or similar 
to each other, the first hypothesis of the approach (or theory) of uncertain future states: 
The shift of the probability of the preliminarily certain event is sufficiently less in 
comparison with that of the preliminarily uncertain (high probability) event.  
(There is no need for such a hypothesis regarding low probabilities)   
More precisely (in terms of final mean values):  
δPcertain  -  the shift of the probability of the preliminarily certain event is as small (in comparison 
with δPhigh - to that of the preliminarily uncertain (high probability) event) as to ensure the 
existence of a finitely small vicinity v100% near P=100%, such as for the mean real values of 
probabilities Phigh mean = Ppreliminary  - |δP| and Pcertain mean = 100% - |δPcertain|   
 
    
inaryprecertain
inaryprehigh
meancertain
meanhigh
P
P
P
P
lim
lim<   
 
where and below  
high  - refers to Ppreliminary (and corresponding P), such as  
  100% - v100% ≤ Phigh preliminary  < 100%  (v100% > 0;  v100% = const).   
 
Typically, it should be sufficient to be true 
 
    |δPcertain| ≤ |δP((100% - v100%)preliminary)|       
 
This hypothesis is intuitively obvious.  Indeed, to be preliminarily certain, the event must 
have additional means to support this excess of certainty.  However it is hard to be precisely and 
generally proved.  Hopefully, it may be proven by collective efforts in the next few years.   
Though being not exactly and generally proved, this hypothesis helps, at least partially, to 
rationally explain a number of remaining unsolved problems (See below in 2. Problems solving).   
 
1.4.4.  Example 
 
The first hypothesis allows transformation from absolute values to normalized (relative) 
ones.  From  
 
Phigh mean  < Phigh preliminary.  
Plow mean  > Plow preliminary,  
 
 
defining normalized values P / Pcertain as Pnormalized, we obtain 
 
(2.2)    Phigh mean normalized < P high preliminary. 
Plow mean normalized  > Plow preliminary,  
 
And, defining Pmean normalized as P, we may rewrite (2.2) in the simplified form as  
 
(2.3)    Phigh  < P high preliminary.  
Plow  > Plow preliminary,  
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2.  Solution of problems  
2.1.  General 
 
The principle of uncertain future can explain, at least partially, a number of problems.   
 
2.2.  Allais paradox, risk aversion, overweighting of low probabilities … 
 
First old fundamental problems, which can be explained, are the Allais paradox, the Ellsberg 
paradox, uniform explanation of both gains and losses, overweighting of low probabilities, risk 
aversion, loss aversion and the equity premium puzzle.   
 
2.2.1.  First type of results.  High probabilities 
 
Let us reconsider a part of the preceding example for probabilities which are close to 100%:   
Suppose Mr. Somebody offers you a choice of only one of the following:  
A guaranteed gain of $99. Or  
A lottery:  
The gain of 1$100 with the probability P(preliminary) = 99% or  
$0 with the (preliminary) probability 1%.   
The mathematical expectations of guarantee Mguarant and lottery Mlott outcomes are exactly 
the same:   
 
Mguarant =$99 × 100% = $99,  Mlott =$100 × 99% = $99,   so, $99 = $99. 
 
But the well-determined experimental fact is: in similar experiments the obvious majority of 
people chose the guaranteed gain instead of the lottery (See, e.g., Tversky and Wakker 1995).  
This is a modification of the aforementioned classical Allais paradox (See Allais 1953).   
 
An explanation  
 
“Anything-can-happen”: the lottery may have defects or suffer a failure; Mr. Somebody or 
you may fall ill; Mr. Somebody’s offer may be a joke or trick; anybody (curious person, terrorist, 
policeman, etc.) may interfere in the process etc.   
So, the real probabilities will be uncertain (independently of whether the preliminary ones 
are or not).  For example, for, e.g., δP = -12% and δPguarant = -5% and normalizing Pguarant to 
100%, 
 
100% - 5% = 95%,     99% - 12% = 87%,    
95% : 95% = 100%     87% : 95% = 91.58% ~ 92%.    
 
Mguarant = $99 × 100% = $99,   Mlott = $100 × 92% < $92,   so, $99 ≥ $92.   
 
So, really, the mathematical expectation of the guarantee outcome is more than that of the lottery 
outcome.   
Therefore, the choice of the majority of people may correspond exactly to the mathematical 
expectations.   
So, the specific principle of uncertain future and its first hypothesis can naturally and clearly 
explain this and similar examples.   
 
                                                 
1 For experiment’s accuracy, both $99 and $100 should be in $1 banknotes. So 99 and 100 banknotes of $1. 
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2.2.2.  Second type of results.  Gains and losses 
The complication of the Allais paradox  
 
We may complicate the previous paradox and may compare these two experiments:  
1) Mr. Somebody offers you a choice of only one of the following2:  
A guaranteed gain of $99. Or  
A lottery:  
The gain of $100 with the probability 99% or  
$0 with the probability 1%. 
2) Mr. Somebody offers you a choice of only one of the following:  
A guaranteed loss of $99. Or  
A lottery:  
The loss of $100 with the probability 99% or  
$0 with the probability 1%. 
The mathematical expectations of the guarantee and lottery outcomes are exactly the same in 
both experiments.  But in similar experiments, the overwhelming majority of people chose (See, 
e.g., Di Mauro and Maffioletti 2004):  
- in the case of gains - the guaranteed gain instead of the lottery one.   
- in the case of losses - the lottery loss instead of the guaranteed one.   
The possible well-known “natural and clear explanation” of gains in the Allais paradox by 
means of risk aversion cannot supply any uniform explanation for both gains and losses.  The 
result of this explanation is gains’ risk aversion and losses’ risk seeking.   
 
An explanation  
 
The ideal preliminary equalities are:  
 
for gains  $99 × 100% = $99,   $100 × 99% = $99,   so, $99 = $99. 
for losses -$99 × 100% = -$99,  -$100 × 99% = -$99,  so, -$99 = -$99. 
 
For real biases, e.g. (See 2.2.1), δP = -12% and δPguarant = -5% and normalized Pguarant mean = 
100% and Pmean = 92%  we have:  
 
for gains:   $99 ×  100% =  $99,   $100 ×  92% =  $92,  so,  $99  >  $92.   
for losses:  -$99 × 100% = -$99,  -$100 × 92% = -$92,  so, -$99 < -$92.   
 
So, actually:  
the mathematical expectation of the guarantee gains’ outcome is more than that of the 
lottery one.   
the mathematical expectation of the lottery losses’ outcome is more than that of the 
guarantee one.   
 
Therefore, in both experiments, the choice of the majority of people may be considered from 
the unified point of view and uniformly.  This choice may correspond exactly to the 
mathematical expectations.   
Therefore, the specific principle of uncertain future and its first hypothesis can naturally and 
clearly explain this and similar examples as well.   
 
                                                 
2 For experiment’s accuracy, both $99 and $100 should be in $1 banknotes. So 99 and 100 banknotes of $1.   
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2.2.3.  Third type of results.  Low probabilities 
 
Let us reconsider a part of the previous example for probabilities which are close to 0%:   
Suppose Mr. Somebody offers you a choice of only one of the following3:  
A guaranteed gain of $1. Or  
A lottery:  
The gain of $100 with the probability Plott =1% or  
$0 with the probability 99%. 
The mathematical expectations of guarantee Mguar and lottery Mlott outcomes are exactly the 
same:   
 
Mguar =$1 × 100% = $1,  Mlott =$100 × 1% = $1,   so, $1 = $1. 
 
But the well-determined experimental fact is: in similar experiments the obvious majority of 
people chose the lottery gain instead of the guaranteed one (See, e.g., Tversky and Wakker 
1995).  This fact is additionally not explained.   
 
An explanation  
 
Due to the specific principle of uncertain future and its first hypothesis  
 
  Plott low mean / Pcertain mean > Plott low preliminary / Pcertain preliminary = 1%.   
 
For shifts from the preliminary to real values, which are equal to, e.g., δP = 1% and δPguarant 
= -2%  and normalized Pguarant normalized = 100% and Pmean normalized = 2%  we have:  
 
Mguarant = $1 × 100% = $1,   Mlott = $100 × 2% < $2,   so, $2 > $1.   
 
So, really, the mathematical expectation of the lottery outcome is more than that of the guarantee 
outcome.   
Therefore, the choice of the majority of people may correspond exactly to the mathematical 
expectations.   
So, the specific principle of uncertain future and its first hypothesis can also naturally and 
clearly explain this and similar examples.   
 
2.3.  Universality and uniformity of the approach of the principle  
 
Thus, the principle of uncertain future, particularly the specific principle of uncertain future, 
can, from the unified point of view and uniformly, explain more than one type of unsolved 
fundamental problems with the additional help of only one hypothesis.   
(Hopefully, this hypothesis may be proven by collective efforts in the next few years)   
 
                                                 
3 For the experiment accuracy, both $99 and $100 should be in $1 banknotes. So 99 and 100 banknotes of $1.   
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3.  Arrangements’ infringements 
3.1.  This paper  
 
The approach of arrangements’ infringements was introduced in Harin (2005).  However, 
instead of following explanatory papers, this approach was not understudied by the scientific 
community.   
A paper about the economic uncertainty principle (as the generalization of arrangements’ 
infringements) (Harin 2006) has not achieved such understanding either.   
So, more than a year’s worth of attempts of explanation of the new approach have shown:  
The author, dealing with the approach for more than 5 years, has failed (and, probably, cannot) 
to explain it clearly to researchers facing the approach for the first time.   
So, explainers and interpreters of the approach are needed.   
 
3.2.  Arrangements’ infringements 
 
The idea of arrangements’ infringements is essentially the same as that of the principle of 
uncertain future.  Actually (and historically), the principle of uncertain future is the 
generalization of the idea of arrangements’ infringements.  Arrangements’ infringements are, in 
a sense, more particular and exact approach.  The first and second hypotheses of the 
arrangements infringements approach (See Harin 2004) are somewhat similar to the specific 
principle of uncertain future and its first hypothesis.   
Below, the approach of arrangements’ infringements is summarized.   
 
3.2.1.  Definitions 
 
Arrangements will refer to arrangements, agreements, assumptions, regulations, bargains, 
contracts, plans, projects, etc.   
Infringements will refer to infringements, breaches, modifications, disturbances, deviations, 
alterations, etc.   
A condition will refer to a condition, term, circumstance, characteristic, etc. Naturally, the 
term “condition” means the essential, material condition.   
An arrangement infringement will refer to an infringement of at least one of the arrangement 
conditions that take place after the decision to fulfill this arrangement was made.  
 
3.2.2.  Hypotheses.  First results.  Applications.   
 
The first hypothesis of the approach is:  
When risky outcomes have probabilities, which are almost the same as the guarantee (100%), 
the arrangement infringement possibility can lessen real, objective probabilities and 
mathematical expectations of such risky outcomes in comparison with the guaranteed ones.   
This hypothesis is obvious though challenging to prove.  It is actually the result, even two 
types of results: explanations of problems of high probabilities and gains and losses.   
Arrangements are the fundamental concept of economics and widespread economic events.  
They are the constituent elements of the majority of items in economic theory.  Infringements of 
arrangements have similar significance.  The variety of applications’ fields of idea’s approach 
can be as important and as wide as that of arrangement infringements.  In particular, these fields 
can be investment, banking, insurance, trade, industry, business projects estimation, planning and 
forecasting.   
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3.2.3.  Analogies   
 
Arrangements’ infringements have rich analogs in other sciences:   
Arrangements’ infringements can be, in a sense, referred to as a “friction,” “dissipation,” 
“noise,” “Brownian motion,” etc. in economics.  (Problems of noise, noise traders, etc. are 
discussed in economics. See, e.g., Capuano 2006, Chay et al 2005 and Hey 2005.)   
These analogs are of obvious original importance.   
Moreover, often, friction, dissipation and noises hide or mask the action of an important law 
or laws.  An example is Galilean’s insight regarding uniform motion.  Such motion could not be 
observed in practice during Galilean times because of the hidden action of friction.   
Arrangements’ infringements (even their possibilities) can hide the action of economic laws.  
The accurate accounting of arrangements’ infringements and their possibility can clear this 
action and these laws.   
So, arrangements’ infringements can be, to some extent, as fundamental, important and 
widespread in economics as their analogs in other sciences.   
So, arrangements’ infringements can be, to some extent, as fundamental, important and 
widespread in economics as economic laws, whose actions they hide.   
 
These analogies and conclusions may also be, at least partially, applied to the principle of 
uncertain future.   
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Conclusions  
 
Harin (2005), Harin (2006) and this paper renew, generalize and develop the results of Hey 
and Orme (1994).  In a simplified form, the conclusions of this paper may be drawn as follows:  
The general principle of uncertain future:  
Future events contain a degree of (hidden) uncertainty.   
The specific principle of uncertain future:  
The probability of every future event contains a degree of (hidden) uncertainty.   
 
Mathematically: 
 
     P  ~  Ppreliminary  ± ∆P 
 
     Pmean=Ppreliminary+ δP  
 
where and below  
P   - real (future) probability;   
Ppreliminary  - the preliminarily determined value of P;   
∆P  - the uncertainty of the real (future) probability;   
δP  - the shift of the real mean value of P in the comparison with the 
preliminarily determined value of P  (δP may be positive or negative).   
 
The first result of the application of the specific principle of uncertain future:  
 
     Phigh < P high preliminary  
Plow > Plow preliminary  
 
where  
high   - refers to probabilities, which values are near 100%  
low   - refers to probabilities, which values are near 0% 
 
This result can, at least partially, solve the Allais paradox, risk aversion, loss aversion, 
overweighting of low probabilities, the Ellsberg paradox, uniform explanation of choices for 
both gains and losses, the equity premium puzzle and other unsolved problems.   
Already this simple result provides the (preliminary) first of three stages of the explanation 
of the shape of the probability weighting function (See, e.g., Tversky and Wakker (1995) and 
Fehr-Duda et al (2006)).   
So, the principle of uncertain future, approach of arrangements’ infringements and results of 
their application may help the progress of utility & prospect theories (and the progress in 
neighboring research fields.   
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